Questions & Answers
Aquinas counts vengeance among the virtues. But isn’t taking revenge a bad thing?
Among the social virtues, those that facilitate the life of men in society, St. Thomas lists vindicta—which we should translate by “just punishment” to avoid the pejorative sense that the words “revenge” or “vengeance” usually has in English. It is a virtue related to the cardinal virtue of justice that aims at punishing the wrongdoer for the crime committed.
Unfortunately, when it comes to the punishment of criminals, the modern world seems to oscillate at whim between two extremes, disproportionate harshness and excessive leniency. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify what we understand for “vengeance,” just punishment.
There is no doubt that restoring the order disturbed by a bad action is a good and virtuous work, demanded by justice itself and the need to preserve social order. However, due to our fallen nature, in the infliction of punishment it is very easy to get carried away by sinful motives (disorderly anger, hatred of the criminal, etc.), which would make such punishment lose its justice, its virtuous character, turning it into a true sin.
St. Thomas explains all this:
Vengeance consists in the infliction of a penal evil on one who has sinned. Accordingly, in the matter of vengeance, we must consider the mind of the avenger. For if his intention is directed chiefly to the evil of the person on whom he takes vengeance and rests there, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: because to take pleasure in another’s evil belongs to hatred, which is contrary to the charity whereby we are bound to love all men. Nor is it an excuse that he intends the evil of one who has unjustly inflicted evil on him, as neither is a man excused for hating one that hates him: for a man may not sin against another just because the latter has already sinned against him, since this is to be overcome by evil, which was forbidden by the Apostle, who says (Romans 12:21): “Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good.” If, however, the avenger’s intention be directed chiefly to some good, to be obtained by means of the punishment of the person who has sinned (for instance that the sinner may amend, or at least that he may be restrained and others be not disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and God honored), then vengeance may be lawful, provided other due circumstances be observed (Summa Theologica, II-II, 108,1).
With these distinctions the true meaning and the dangers of this virtue become clear. For greater abundance, St. Thomas examines some objections that may be raised against it and, in solving them, rounds off the doctrine.
Some object that he who takes revenge usurps a function exclusively of God (Deut. 32:35), and that is sin. St. Thomas answers that whoever exercises vengeance on the wicked in the exercise of his functions and jurisdiction—for example, the civil authorities—does not usurp anything from God, but uses the power that He grants him (Rom. 13:4). But if someone takes revenge outside of the order established by God, he usurps what is proper to Him, and therefore sins.
Others, more pious, object that those who are good must tolerate the bad and endure patiently their injuries. St. Thomas points out that this is how it should be when those injuries refer to their own persons, but not if they are injuries against God or against neighbor. Because, as St. John Chrysostom says, “to be patient with one’s injuries is worthy of praise; but to want to conceal injuries against God is impious.”
In practice, it will rarely be convenient for a private person to attempt, by himself, to punish the guilty (except by repelling an unjust aggression in legitimate defense), because under the pretext of justice and equity an exacerbated self-love and perhaps true hatred of neighbor will often be hidden. That is why it is always advisable to forgive the injuries of others instead of punishing them, unless the honor of God, the common good or the amendment of others require that we demand reparation for the injury.
Which are the natural properties of marriage?
There are two, unity and indissolubility. These properties derive from the very nature and ends of marriage. Therefore, they do not depend on the will of the spouses, and they are not affected by the accidental circumstances of a concrete marriage.
Unity is the bond existing between one man and one woman. It is demanded by the primary end of marriage, which is procreation and education of children. It opposes polyandry (one woman with many husbands), as it makes paternity uncertain and, in consequence, it makes also uncertain to whom belongs the duty of education of the children. Moreover, it is unnatural not to know, and therefore honor, one’s father. Strictly speaking, it is not against polygamy (one man with many women), but it also causes serious difficulties, both regarding the education of children and the secondary end of marriage.
Unity is also demanded by the secondary end of marriage, the mutual love and support of the spouses. Polygamy causes an inequality of rights between the spouses, as the man has full, exclusive rights on the women, but not the women on man. Moreover, it affects the real human and spiritual love and causes discords and jealousies between women and children.
Indissolubility signifies that the bond subsists as long as spouses live and it cannot be dissolved by any motive. It is demanded by the primary end, because both the care and education of children require the permanent union of spouses. Even if they do not have children, the general rule is not affected by concrete circumstances (the law is not founded on extraordinary cases).
In any case, the secondary end of marriage still demands indissolubility. Human love is not only sexual impulse—sex is integrated as part of human love. Without indissolubility, one risks falling prey to the selfishness of instinct, and the union of the family being abandoned to the vagaries of our movements of pleasure. Indissolubility defends conjugal love, as true love is needed for the mutual help and perfection of the spouses.
The common life and support of the spouses requires daily effort. If the possibility of divorce is allowed, it has a magnifying effect on the unavoidable conflicts that arise in common life.
Moreover, the dissolution of a marriage affects the children morally and affectively, and it is also injustice towards the spouse, as the gift of self that was promised in the marriage ceremony is forgotten when difficulties arise.
Current Issue
