Veritatis Splendor
COMMENTARY
The Holy Father’s newest Encyclical is being praised by conservatives as “the greatest work since Pascendi,” criticized by others for its self-admitted Vatican II perspective. Liberals are ignoring it.
What can be said?
The Encyclical Veritatis Splendor of Pope John Paul II has not passed unperceived. It has provoked position-taking of all sorts. What then should we think of this document?
One finds there good expositions, even very good ones, and we are happy to see the Pope appeal to his authority. Finally the Holy See is condemning Relativism and Subjectivism in moral matters, the autonomy of the conscience, situation ethics (nos. 32-34); the Pope affirms the primacy of the truth over liberty (nos. 62 and 72), and he says that the erroneous conscience constitutes an objective disorder (no. 63). Applied with logic to the social order, this principle would undermine religious liberty.
Certainly, you find a goodly number of citations from the Second Vatican Council, but they are for the most part interpreted in the sense given by traditional teaching, which is a tiny contribution towards correcting the council.
However, you find equally certain weaknesses which cause the personalism of the present Pope to appear (no. 13, for example) and even his obsession for the establishment of a universal democracy (no. 96). It is said that an important number of theologians collaborated in the redaction of the text. It is not astonishing, therefore, that it is not very homogeneous.
One would be inclined to judge the substance of the encyclical as good, some passages even very good. But there are accidentally things which are very much in the present line of personalism, which in Moral Theology glorify the person (the terminus a quo of the moral act) in the place of establishing nature as the order of morality which is the same for everyone independently of times and circumstances.
Moreover, one can deplore the fact that political morality is barely touched. The same may be said of Moral Theology which took such an important place in the letters of Saint Paul that he bases his teaching upon the principle that the baptized are the temples of the Holy Ghost. However, one cannot reproach the Pope for not treating every subject. The criterion of a judgement is found rather in the doctrinal rectitude than in the aspect of the totality of all the considerations implied in the subject.
1) If the encyclical affirms rightly the close tie between Faith and Morality, it must needs be first that doctrinal rectitude in matters of Faith be re-established if one does not want to build a house upon sand. It is necessary then that from now on acts must follow, that is, the condemnation of those who undermine the Faith and Morality.
2) What a contradiction exists between the spirit of Assisi, the laicisation of society on the one hand, and Veritatis Splendor on the other! What remains of religious liberty or ecumenism with the libertine Protestants if one applies the principles of the encyclical? It is folly to wish to maintain both the one and the other, but this is exactly the double face of liberalism, well illustrated by Pope Paul VI publishing the encyclical Humanae Vitae several years after having signed the documents of the council extolling at least implicitly the autonomy of the conscience.
3) Have not Archbishop Lefebvre and the Society of Saint Pius X, during all the years which have passed since the council, fought against the errors enumerated in the encyclical and preached the primacy of the truth and the law over that of liberty and of conscience? What have the professors of moral theology and spirituality taught and teach still in our seminaries if not precisely this second part of the encyclical (nos. 28-83)? By our firmness in the combat, we have certainly contributed to the publication of such a document; let us continue in this same firmness! One could say that Father Cottier, one of the principal authors of the encyclical, has copied our dubia concerning the objective evil in the erroneous conscience. All things considered, the reactions on the subject of this encyclical reveal those upon whom the Pope can count in the re-establishment of the Faith and of Morality: neither upon Küng nor upon Drewermann; and in the defense of the natural law, neither upon the Protestants nor the Moslems, but of course on the priests of the Society of Saint Pius X.
4) One must admit that the Holy See has for a long time habituated us to a legitimate mistrust vis-à-vis its documents; nevertheless, we must retain an objective eye with a benevolent <>a priori without, however, giving ourselves over to illusion, but also, on the other hand without bitter zeal. One must before all else pray and encourage others to pray that Peter might be converted and strengthen his brethren in the Faith (Lk. 22:32).
Like Humanae Vitae, Veritatis Splendor< is a document which shows that the Holy Ghost has not abandoned His Church, that the See of Peter is not vacant. But it also shows that the return in the domain of Faith, of morality, of liturgy and of the discipline of the Church shall perhaps be more difficult and slower than we think. In any case, the combat has not ended.
My astonishment, to be honest, comes above all from the fact that it is a flagrant condemnation of the constant discourse of John Paul II. It denounces, for example, ‘the opposition and even the radical separation of liberty and truth . . .’
The Splendor of the Truth. Such is the title of the latest encyclical of John Paul II concerning several fundamental questions of the Church’s moral teaching. Everyone is talking about it, everyone is gritting their teeth in anticipation. Then I read it, entirely, pen in hand. . . and I can only tell you one thing: my astonishment! First of all, it is readable and understandable without effort! Next, it recalls the authority of the Church in this matter, and addressing itself to bishops, it reminds them with force of their duty of preserving right doctrine, and of looking to what those institutions placed under their authority are teaching as well, without fearing to take away the name of “Catholic” from those who do not preserve this doctrine. Finally, and above all, despite the multiple citations from Vatican II which encumber it uselessly, it erects an astounding synthesis of rigor from the principles of traditional Catholic morality. The essential of the doctrine is drawn from the best sources: Sacred Scripture, the Fathers of the Church, Saint Thomas Aquinas. . . . I see nothing grave in it as I said before, even if the thought remains burdened with a diffused, heavy and tenacious anthropo-centrism.
My astonishment, to be honest, comes above all from the fact that it is a flagrant condemnation of the constant discourse of John Paul II. It denounces, for example, “the opposition and even the radical separation of liberty and truth . . . the result of a dichotomy more grave and destructive, that which disassociates the faith from morality” (no. 88); it continues by saying, which is profoundly true, that “through the moral life faith becomes confession, not only before God, but also before men: it makes itself a testimony” (no. 89). But then. . . how can one be in agreement with the Protestants who disassociate faith from works? How can one still incense Luther and all his hirelings?
Perhaps it isn’t useless to recall what underscores every discourse upon morality, with the understanding that it also has faith as its object. Moral Theology is, in effect, that part of theology which, in the light of Revelation and the articles of the faith, considers the entire order of human action. It determines the rule of human acts in order that they be conformed to the will of God and may conduct man to his end: beatitude. It considers then all that is human: the finality and the nature of man, all of which he disposes to conduct his life: the passions, conscience, will, liberty, law, grace and all the universe of virtues and vices. All that depends on human life, the interior and spiritual life, the exterior and active life, social and political life. . . everything which is human is the object of moral theology.
And among the virtues, there is in the foreground, the theological virtues (faith, hope, and charity). And among the moral virtues, there is in the foreground, the virtue of justice, from which springs the virtue of religion which inclines one to render unto God the cult that is due Him. In conclusion, it is clear that the order of the faith, and of the acts of religion cannot escape the order of the moral life. On the contrary, it constitutes the summit and completion, since these virtues order man and his acts directly to his last end: God in His Trinity.
It is suitable then to apply to the order of the faith all the principles of moral theology so well exposed. . . but then, what will remain of the preaching of John Paul II and his council? Some examples will make one better seize the thing and its importance.
Let us read no. 32: “Certain currents of modern thought have gone so far as to exalt freedom to such an extent that it becomes an absolute, which would then be the source of values. . . the inescapable claims of truth disappear, yielding their place to a criterion of sincerity, authenticity, and ‘being at peace with oneself,’ so much so that some have come to adopt a radically subjectivistic conception of moral judgement.” No. 41: “the liberty of man and the law of God meet and are called to intersect. . .” No. 42: “Patterned on God’s freedom, man’s freedom is not negated by his obedience to the divine law; indeed, only through this obedience does it abide in the truth and conform to human dignity.” No. 64: “Freedom of conscience is never freedom ‘from’ the truth but always and only freedom ‘in’ the truth.” No. 87: “To recognize the truth is the condition for authentic freedom.”
But who then preaches to all comers liberty at any price? And what remains of the conciliar teaching on religious liberty? How can one speak of a recognized liberty given to systems which are not in the truth? Is this a liberty worthy of the name? Can one grant it, recognize it, encourage it, proclaim it. . . as do a certain council and a certain Pope?
Let us read further. No. 63: “The evil done as the result of invincible ignorance or a nonculpable error of judgement may not be imputable to the agent; but even in this case, it does not cease to be an evil, a disorder in relation to the truth about the good. Furthermore, a good act which is not recognized as such does not contribute to the moral growth of the person who performs it; it does not perfect him, and it does not help to dispose him for the supreme good.” No. 81: “If acts are intrinsically evil, a good intention or particular circumstances can diminish their evil, but they cannot remove it. They remain irremediably evil acts; per se and in themselves, they are not capable of being ordered to God and to the good of the person.” No. 87: “The true adorers of God must adore Him ‘in spirit and in truth’ (Jn. 4:23); they become free by this adoration.”
In fact, there is an identity between the true and the good, and nothing can be good if it isn’t conformed to the true. What’s more, there is only liberty in the adoration of the true God. . . and if, indeed,” it is meet and right, always and for everyone, to serve God, to render Him the worship which is His due” (no. 52), can it be good to adore any other being than the one true God? Isn’t this, rather, intrinsically evil since the first commandment prescribes that we adore God alone? How can the acts of non-Catholic worship be virtuous? How can the other cults be means of salvation? And what becomes then of all the ecumenism and religious liberty so loved by our Pope?
Our text here recalls some excellent principles, applicable to every human act; but not to apply them to those acts which depend on the virtues of faith or religion, would be, indeed to create a grave and destructive dichotomy which disassociates the faith from morality. In short, this encyclical, despite several passages which savor too much of the council, gladdens me greatly for it faithfully recalls to the minds of men the two of the three things they must know to be saved: what they must desire and what they must do. This is already precious. My joy shall be complete when it will receive its logical complement in the order of faith, with the faithful reminder of all the first order of knowledge necessary for salvation, that of the truths which one must believe.
At the end of the reading of this encyclical to the tone and the content so unexpected and so joyful, I can only address an immediate prayer to God: that the Pope who has just come from giving us a text the like of which there is no other example in the Church for the last thirty years, may make of it a prompt meditation. Without doubt, he has already done so, but may he draw from it all the consequences, and apply them to himself and his own thought, principles so well enunciated: the universal and unchangeable natural law, the vital bond between faith and morality, between faith and liberty, the primacy of the object over the subject. . . and that he may apply all these excellent principles to the order of all the virtues, without omitting the virtues of faith and religion. On that day, perhaps we shall finally see “respected the right of the faithful to receive Catholic doctrine in its purity and integrity” (no. 113).
May God aid him, for on that day we shall finally have recovered him who, at Rome, should be your father so as to strengthen us in the faith, and, thus, the Church will recover all The Splendor of It’s Truth.
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