Questions and Answers
Is it permissible to publish the sins of deceased persons?
It is certainly true that a man's reputation is the most precious exterior possession that he can have, as the book of Proverbs states, "A good name is better than great riches" (Prov. 22:1), and that he has a strict right to it in justice. It is also true that despite the fact that the modern world considers that a reputation is of little consequence, it is a sign of honor and goodness that a man values the opinion that others have of his excellence. Finally, it is also true that reputation concerns principally a man's practice of virtue, and only secondarily his other good qualities, and that this right is not extinguished by death, for a man, having an immortal soul, always has a right to his reputation. Consequently, the deliberate telling or publishing of the sins that a man committed during his life, without proportionate reason, is a mortal sin of detraction both against justice and against charity, even if the facts told are perfectly true.
However, the right to one's reputation is not absolute, and has limitations. Just as we can tell the sins of the living, if it is necessary for their own good (that they might be corrected), or for the good of a third person (to prevent him from being led into error or sin), or for the common good, so also do there exist reasons for relating the sins of deceased persons. In the case of the deceased it is usually the common good that is invoked, and rightly so. In fact, an historian of the Reformation who would not tell the sins of King Henry VIII or Luther could not be considered an historian. He would not tell the truth, and his history would serve no purpose. Likewise an historian of Pope John Paul II who would not tell of his public sin of religious indifferentism at Assisi in 1986 would not tell the truth. History is the master of life, as the saying goes, and to do so it must tell all that pertains to the truth, the evil as well as the good, the faults of Catholics as well as their virtues. Hence the moral theologians are in agreement that for the sake of history itself, there is always a sufficient reason, in virtue of the common good, for relating all certainly true events, and backing up with documents (cf. Prummer, II, §194).
This applies to all persons who are public, who have a role in history, and notably writers, authors, artists and men of ideas, and even with respect to acts that were not publicly known while they were alive. It is only by the full picture of their lives that their impact on history can be evaluated. Thus it cannot be considered a sin against justice for persons to have made known the already published sins of Eric Gill, who as an activist in the Catholic Distributist movement was a public and historical figure.
Nevertheless, a disorder can frequently arise in such matters, due to a certain curiosity about evil things that is common to fallen human nature. It is very easy for the mode of telling of sins to be excessive and scandalous, and to become a serious sin against charity.
Such is the case of those who would concentrate on a man's sins before his conversion, or who would describe his sins in a very graphic manner. This is particularly the case with sins against the sixth commandment, in which all detail is an occasion of sin, and very dangerous to relate or to read. Some people, however, wrongly take advantage of such sins to promote their own cause. The Internet is easily abused for gossip mongering, and those who went into the details of Gill's moral life on the Internet were sinning against charity by the manner and publicity that they gave to this discussion, and also on account of the scandal that an unnecessary and excessively public discussion of sins against purity does cause.
The key issue is the common good. Persons who have a particularly immoral life should only be discussed if the common good requires it, as it does with Luther or Henry VIII. However, the Catholic in charity ought to avoid so doing if it is not really necessary for history. It is for this reason that prudence dictates that it is preferable not to quote from or bring up the subject of such persons, particular if they are Catholic, on account of the scandal that the telling of historical facts could cause.
Is it morally obligatory to vote?
It is certainly true that the modernists consider democracy, and the right to vote, as sacrosanct, an immediate consequence of human dignity, directly connected with their humanistic religion.
Reacting against this, knowing as we do how much the electoral system is unjust, realizing how much modern democracy is based upon the false liberal principle of human freedom, escaping from all objective divine and moral law as it does, aware of how little real choice there is between the candidates, as also of how false is the impression that one man's vote is really going to make a difference to such a secular, ungodly system–we might easily conclude that there is no obligation to vote at all.
Yet the Church's teaching on the subject is not anything new. Without approving the modern system of democracy and its false principle of the sovereignty of the people, the Church nevertheless binds us to contribute towards the common good of society, by an obligation of legal justice. This principle is expressed well by Pope Pius XII in his April 20, 1946, discourse to Italian Catholic Action:
The people is called on to take an always larger part in the public life of the nation. This participation brings with it grave responsibilities. Hence the necessity for the faithful to have clear, solid, precise knowledge of their duties in the moral and religious domain with respect to their exercise of their civil rights, and in particular of the right to vote.
In fact, Pope Pius XII had clearly explained that it is precisely on account of the anti-Catholic and secular spirit that surrounds Catholics that they have the duty to defend the Church by the correct exercise of their right to vote. It is to prevent a greater evil. He had stated on March 16, 1946, to the parish priests of Rome:
The exercise of the right to vote is an act of grave moral responsibility, at least with respect to the electing of those who are called to give to a country its constitution and its laws, and in particular those that affect the sanctification of holy days of obligation, marriage, the family, schools and the just and equitable regulation of many social questions. It is the Church's duty to explain to the faithful the moral duties that flow from this electoral right.
Pope Pius XII was even more explicit two years later, again when speaking to the parish priests of Rome. He explained that in the precise circumstances of the time it was an obligation under pain of mortal sin for all the faithful to use their vote, and this even for women. Although it is certainly true that in the traditional conception of democracy it is only the heads of families who vote, it is perfectly permissible for women to use the right of vote when it is granted, and in fact it becomes an obligation to do so when the common good depends upon all Catholics using their vote correctly.
Here is the text of March 10, 1948:
In the present circumstances, it is a strict obligation for all those who have the right to vote, men and women, to take part in the elections. Whoever abstains from doing so, in particular by indolence or weakness, commits a sin grave in itself, a mortal fault. Each one must follow the dictate of his own conscience. However, it is obvious that the voice of conscience imposes on every Catholic to give his vote to the candidates who offer truly sufficient guarantees for the protection of the rights of God and of souls, for the true good of individuals, families and of society, according to the love of God and Catholic moral teaching.
This application of the Church's social teaching to the particular situation of the time is in accord with the teaching of the moral theologians, who speak of the grave sin of omission for those who simply neglect to elect good, Catholic representatives, and of the duty of doing all in our power of encouraging suitable laymen to work towards using the electoral system to obtain worthy lawmakers.
However, how far removed we are from this situation! Clearly, we are no longer in the circumstance of having to change between Catholic and non-Catholic, morally upright and liberal representatives. All the alternatives are liberal, the deception and the manipulation of the public by the media is rampant. In practice, it generally comes down to the question of whether or not it is permissible to vote for an unworthy candidate (e.g., a candidate who only approves abortion in cases of rape or incest), for he would at least (we suppose) be the lesser evil. In such a case, there can be no obligation to vote, for all the reasons that could oblige, mentioned by Pope Pius XII, no longer apply. Nevertheless, it is still permissible to vote in such a case, provided that one can be sure that there truly is a lesser evil, and that there is a grave reason to do so (e.g., to avoid abortion on demand, or promotion of unnatural methods of birth control), and one has the good intention of providing for the good of society as best one can. This is called material cooperation. However, it can never be obligatory.
Consequently, in the rare case that there is a clearly, publicly Catholic candidate who supports the teaching of the Church, there is a strict moral obligation to vote, under pain of mortal sin. Where there is a clear gain possible from the correct use of a vote for some other candidate, it can be recommended or counseled. However, when there is no clear advantage it would be better to abstain, so as not to contribute even to a material participation.
Fr. Peter Scott was ordained by Archbishop Lefebvre in 1988. After assignments as seminary professor and the U.S. District Superior, he is currently the rector of Holy Cross Seminary in Goulburn, Australia.
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