January 2007 Print

Fr. François Knittel

Does God tolerate some evils?

The history of the human race after original sin shows that God does tolerate some evils, whether physical or moral. Each of us can make this observation in imitation of Pope Leo XIII, who taught that "God Himself in His providence, though infinitely good and powerful, permits evil to exist in the world, partly that greater good may not be impeded, and partly that greater evil may not ensue."⁴

Does tolerating evil mean approving or willing it?

Evil, which is opposed to our true good, can neither be approved by the intellect nor wanted by the will. Our intellect is ordered to the true and our will to the good. Neither one of these faculties can embrace error or evil without frustrating its innate end.

No authority may give such a command, because it is contrary to nature to oblige the mind and the will of man to error and evil, or to consider one or the other as indifferent. Not even God could give such a positive command or positive authorization, because it would be in contradiction to His absolute truth and sanctity.⁵

Common sense still tells us that tolerance is the opposite of approval: it means the patient forbearance of something with the intention and in the expectation of remedying the situation. Toleration of injustice is not the same as consenting to it. On the contrary, it means disapproving it and intending to put an end to it as soon as it becomes possible to do so without provoking a greater injustice.⁶

Does evil have any rights?

Evil, which turns man away from his end, has no right to exist, or to propagate, or to act; only that which is true and honest has.

Evil is a privation of a due good, and error is the evil of the intellect. Neither one can be approved or willed or, still less, be the object of a right for "there can never be any right contrary to the eternal laws of justice."⁷

For this reason, while not conceding any right to anything save what is true and honest, she does not forbid public authority to tolerate what is at variance with truth and justice, for the sake of avoiding some greater evil, or of obtaining or preserving some greater good.⁸

"[I]t is contrary to reason that error and truth should have equal rights,"⁹ as it is contrary to reason that cancer should have the same rights over the body as health does. That is why "that which does not correspond to truth or to the norm of morality objectively has no right to exist, to be spread or to be activated."¹⁰

The Pope appeals to justice and to reason, because it is not just to ascribe the same rights to good and to evil, to truth and to error.¹¹

But it is one thing to tolerate, and another thing to admit a right. One tolerates evil, but one does not approve it.¹²

Why does God tolerate evil?

God tolerates some evils so as not to prevent some greater goods.

The liturgy suggests the reason for this Divine tolerance when, recalling the Fall, which had such dramatic consequences for the human race, it exclaims: "O certe necessarium Adae peccatum, quod Christi morte deletum est! O Felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem."¹³ The order of Divine Providence integrates some evils into its general plan, which is always directed to the good, according to the word of the Apostle: "Diligentibus Deum, omnia cooperantur in bonum–to them that love God, all things work together unto good" (Rom. 8:28). St. Thomas judiciously explains the reason for this Divine tolerance:

The good is great and victorious over evil, because the good can exist without evil whereas evil cannot exist without the good; that is why God bears with many evils, so that many goods may come or else not perish.¹⁴

What does the Gospel teach about toleration?

To know the teaching of Jesus Christ on tolerance, one should refer to the parable of the wheat and the tares. Pope Pius XII explicitly mentions this parable in order to justify his teachings on the exercise of tolerance:

Not to mention here other Scriptural texts which are adduced in support of this argument, Christ in the parable of the cockle gives the following advice: let the cockle grow in the field of the world together with the good seed in view of the harvest (cf. Mt. 13:24-30). The duty of repressing moral and religious error cannot therefore be an ultimate norm of action. It must be subordinate to higher and more general norms, which in some circumstances permit, and even perhaps seem to indicate as the better policy, toleration of error in order to promote a greater good.¹⁵

Commenting on this parable, St. Thomas enumerates four reasons why the wicked should not be removed for the sake of the good:

One reason is that the good are tried by the bad....Then, it may happen that someone who is bad now may later become good, like St. Paul. For if Paul had been killed, we would have been deprived of the doctrine of so great a master, which God forbid....

In the third place, some seem bad but are not; that is why if you wanted to remove the wicked, you would also extirpate many of the good. And this is clear from the fact that God did not want them to be uprooted before reaching perfect maturity....

The fourth reason comes from the fact that a man can have great power; in this case, were he excluded, he would drag many with him, and then many would perish with the wicked one.¹⁶

Must men imitate this Divine tolerance?

In the government of earthly affairs, men must imitate Divine toleration. If God, who is truth and sanctity, acts with tolerance, those who govern earthly things are invited to imitate Him:

Human government is derived from the Divine government, and should imitate it. Now although God is all-powerful and supremely good, nevertheless He allows certain evils to take place in the universe, which He might prevent, lest, without them, greater goods might be forfeited, or greater evils ensue. Accordingly in human government also, those who are in authority rightly tolerate certain evils, lest certain goods be lost, or certain greater evils be incurred: thus Augustine says (De Ordine ii.4): "If you do away with harlots, the world will be convulsed with lust."¹⁷

Who exercises tolerance?

The authority in the family, in society, or in the Church applies tolerance. In the framework of a familial, civil, or religious society, only the authority is apt to practice tolerance for the sake of the common good:

But if, in such circumstances, for the sake of the common good (and this is the only legitimate reason), human law may or even should tolerate evil, it may not and should not approve or desire evil for its own sake; for evil of itself, being a privation of good, is opposed to the common welfare which every legislator is bound to desire and defend to the best of his ability.¹⁸

Thus it is the political authority in the city and the religious authority for what involves questions of morality that must apply the principles of tolerance to particular situations:

Before all else the Catholic statesman must judge if this condition is verified in the concrete–this is the "question of fact." In his decision he will permit himself to be guided by weighing the dangerous consequences that stem from toleration against those from which the community of nations will be spared if the formula of toleration be accepted. Moreover, he will be guided by the good which, according to a wise prognosis, can be derived from toleration for the international community as such, and indirectly for the member state. In that which concerns religion and morality he will also ask for the judgment of the Church. For her, only he to whom Christ has entrusted the guidance of His whole Church is competent to speak in the last instance on such vital questions touching international life; that is, the Roman Pontiff.¹⁹

What circumstances justify tolerance?

Tolerance is justified whenever and for as long as by it one can promote a greater good or avoid a greater evil.

Tolerance is not a good in itself, no more so than freedom is. Tolerance is only morally licit when the suppression of an evil would cause greater evils than the one being tolerated. In such instances the popes speak "of avoiding some greater evil, or of obtaining or preserving some greater good."²⁰

In practice, what does this mean?

The following specific examples can be given of "greater evil" to be avoided or "greater good" to be obtained by religious tolerance:

_• "Greater evil": scandal of the faithful on seeing the persecution of dissidents; civil war; obstacle to the conversion of the misguided to the true Faith...

_• "Greater good": civil cooperation and peaceful coexistence of citizens of different religions when it can be effectively obtained...; a greater liberty for the Church in the accomplishment of her supernatural mission...²¹

Are there limits to tolerance?

The exercise of tolerance is unjustified if it engenders more evil than good.

Since tolerance is only good in certain circumstances and not in and of itself, it is thus limited in its exercise. The canonist Capello detailed, for example, the limits to the tolerance of the public worship of false religions in these terms:

That is why the freedom of worship cannot be admitted except on these conditions: 1) that it be civil tolerance, not religious (which would include a profession of indifference towards the diverse religions); and consequently, that 2) it not be taken as an approval of evil or of a false religion; 3) that it be admitted as a remedy required by circumstances temporarily, that is, only for as long as serious reasons pertaining to public order prevail; 4) that it not impede a prudent exposition of the truth and initiatives for the restoration of good law.²²

This teaching was confirmed by Archbishop Lefebvre when he wrote:

Tolerance loses its reason for being if it brings more evil than good...Tolerance could be good for a time and then become bad...If private tolerance is sufficient, there is no reason to grant public tolerance, and even less a liberty of propaganda for moral or religious error.²³

Is the practice of toleration for a limited time and duration?

Tolerance is licit only so long as the conditions and circumstances that gave rise to it last.

One of the limits that circumscribes the exercise of tolerance is duration. It is especially necessary to emphasize this, for what lasts a long time often seems to men to gain an autonomous existence and a right to exist. If custom is like a second nature and often acquires the force of law, this holds true of bad custom as well as of good. Hence the insistence by popes and canonists that tolerance not be extended longer than necessary:

Wherefore, if such tolerance would be injurious to the public welfare, and entail greater evils on the State, it would not be lawful; for in such case the motive of good is wanting.²⁴

Today as in the past, where the circumstances make it advisable, one may exercise tolerance towards false religions and false doctrines, but when such circumstances no longer pertain, the rights of the truth must be maintained, and men preserved from error.²⁵

The measure of the tolerance of evil is this: it may be tolerated so long as that is necessary to avoid greater evils or not to impede greater goods.²⁶

What virtues oblige the granting of toleration?

When tolerance is an obligation, it is a duty of political prudence towards the common good and also a duty of charity towards the misguided, but in no instance is it a duty of justice.

Toleration of an evil can be the object of an obligation in certain circumstances. This obligation, however, does not derive from justice, for the object of justice is a right,²⁷ and, as Pius XII reiterates, "that which does not correspond to truth or to the norm of morality objectively has no right to exist, to be spread or to be activated."²⁸

However, tolerance can be obligatory from the standpoint of political prudence, which unceasingly pursues the common good and considers the obstacles to be overcome,²⁹ and from the standpoint of charity towards the strayed sheep, that they may be attracted by the Church. On the eve of Vatican II, such was the common teaching:

In this protection of the true Faith, it is necessary to proceed according to the exigencies of Christian charity and of prudence, so that the dissidents not be estranged from the Church through fear, but rather that they be drawn to her; and that neither the city nor the Church suffer any harm from it.³⁰

This summary merely repeated the teachings of the pontiffs and canonists:

[T]he tolerance of evil which is dictated by political prudence should be strictly confined to the limits which its justifying cause, the public welfare, requires.³¹

That is why, should it be foreseen that, both for the Church and for the State, greater evils must result from intolerance than from civil tolerance, this same duty [the more universal duty incumbent upon the public authority to avert evil insofar as that is possible], according to the rules of prudence and charity, counsels tolerance, not that it must be approved in itself, but because, in the circumstances, it is a lesser evil.³²

Can the exercise of tolerance be the object of a duty?

When there is a great good to promote or a great evil to avoid, toleration is a duty of prudence and of charity. If tolerance is not a good in itself independently of the circumstances that justify its exercise, it should not be deduced that its exercise would always be optional. No, there are cases in which its practice would be the object of a veritable duty:

...in such circumstances, for the sake of the common good (and this is the only legitimate reason), human law may or even should tolerate evil...³³

The State may, or must, tolerate evil or error any time such tolerance concurs with or promotes a greater good.³⁴

Does someone who acts badly or who is in error acquire a right to be tolerated?

Since tolerance is governed by prudence and charity, and not by justice, it confers no right to be tolerated upon the one who errs.

From the tolerance that can become a duty and an obligation for the authority in a society, a natural right of the erring party to be tolerated cannot be deduced. This becomes obvious upon considering what is common to justice and to charity, and what each one has in particular. Justice, like charity, can engender obligations; in this there is no difference between them. But in justice I give to my neighbor what belongs to him, whereas in charity I give to my neighbor what belongs to me. In justice, I give to my neighbor what is his, while in charity I give what is mine.

If tolerance were a duty in justice, it would become a principle the application of which would be universally good, since we must always render our neighbor what we owe him and what already belongs to him. If tolerance is a duty of charity and of prudence, as we have seen that it is, it is limited by certain circumstances in which I cede what is mine for my neighbor's sake. The obligation and the duty on my side do not engender a right to be claimed by the other party. Thus, while I have the general duty to give alms sometimes, no needy person can require it of me as his right.

Since the notion of a right to tolerance based upon justice is the current error, Archbishop Lefebvre used to teach:

Let us carefully distinguish on the one hand the virtue of justice, which, by assigning their duties to some, gives to others the corresponding right, that is to say, the power to demand, and, on the other hand, the virtue of charity, which indeed imposes duties onto some, without however assigning any right to the others.³⁵

One tolerates evil, but one does not approve it.³⁶

In certain cases error is tolerated, but it is never admitted to be a natural right...It is normal for the Church, then, to tolerate what it cannot prevent as in a place where there is a majority of non-Catholics. But the heads of State can only offer the dissident tolerance, they cannot admit their possession of any natural right.³⁷

The duty of tolerance in those being tolerated does not create any right to be tolerated since a right supposes, on the authority granting such right, a duty of justice.³⁸

Does the principle of tolerance have applications in a Catholic's personal life?

Since the heart of man itself is shared by good and evil, the exercise of toleration towards oneself is often a necessity.

While it is true that tolerance has many varied applications in civil society, it is of real interest for each of us. Indeed, good and evil dispute within our own hearts. There is matter to practice tolerance towards ourselves even as we work to correct ourselves.

We are sinners, we have evil tendencies, but we are not going to kill ourselves because we cannot tolerate our vices; we must bear with ourselves, to a certain degree, without, however, approving our vices. We bear them while trying to combat them and re-establish order within ourselves.³⁹

We know that it is impossible to completely suppress sin; we cannot suppress ourselves. Of course, one tolerates sin as one tolerates oneself. But that does not mean that we put our virtues and vices on a par, saying that the ones are as good as the others. On the contrary, we fight against our vices, even though we know that we shall suffer from something until the end of our days. The point is clear: we tolerate ourselves and others.⁴⁰

Does tolerance apply to social life?

Tolerance applies to society when a frontal attack against certain evils would lead to the dissolution of society, to the destruction of the common good, or to anarchy.

In imitation of the Divine government of the universe, which tolerates certain evils in order to attain a greater good or to avoid a greater evil, human societies must sometimes practice tolerance.⁴¹ This is all the more true for men, in that civil society often only reaches the exterior aspect of human acts, whereas the Sovereign Judge judges both the internal forum and external manifestations. Human positive law cannot forbid all that the moral law forbids⁴² under pain of rendering social life impossible.⁴³

The rule of toleration in civil society is always the common good, sometimes considered in the aspect of "public welfare."⁴⁴

It is thus always necessary to consider the common good of the Church as well as that of the State, in virtue of which a just tolerance, even sanctioned by laws, can, according to the circumstances, be incumbent upon the civil power...In this matter, it is necessary to take into account, not only the good of the national interest, but also that of the universal Church or the international public order.⁴⁵

Does the Church sometimes permit the exercise of tolerance?

In the case of a society divided by religions in which the repression of the public exercise of false worship could lead to grave evils for society, the Church allows the use of tolerance towards the false religions.

Our Mother the Church knows both the cockle and the enemy that sowed it. She thus knows that tolerance is often a necessity in order to advance things more humano vulnerato [in a way suited to men wounded by original sin]. Her principles in the matter have never changed, even if the corruption of the present times necessitates that these principles be applied more often than previously:

Yet, with the discernment of a true mother, the Church weighs the great burden of human weakness, and well knows the course down which the minds and actions of men are in this our age being borne.⁴⁶

Does a policy of the toleration of false religions imply the equality of religions or necessitate the indifferentism of the State and its official abstention from public acts of worship?

The need to tolerate in specific circumstances the public exercise of false religions does not signify the equality of all religions or the obligation of the civil authorities to refrain from participating in acts of public worship.

The toleration of an evil such as the public exercise of false religions is the prudent and charitable response to an unfortunate state of things. This concrete response takes away nothing of the obligation for each and all, individuals and societies, to honor God according to the true religion He has revealed. It is one thing to tolerate false religions, and something entirely different to affirm the false principle of the equality of religions or the agnosticism of the State:

Nor is there any reason why any one should accuse the Church of being wanting in gentleness of action or largeness of view, or of being opposed to real and lawful liberty. The Church, indeed, deems it unlawful to place the various forms of divine worship on the same footing as the true religion, but does not, on that account, condemn those rulers who, for the sake of securing some great good or of hindering some great evil, patiently allow custom or usage to be a kind of sanction for each kind of religion having its place in the State.⁴⁷

In the 19th century, Dom Guéranger carefully distinguished between tolerance (or liberty, as they called it then) on the one hand, and indifferentism and the agnosticism of the State on the other:

I know that [the liberals] always try to muddle the question by demanding it in the name of the freedom promised and guaranteed to dissidents; but haven't we replied a thousand times that this freedom, having become a fundamental article of our new public law, only involves a small minority of citizens, who have no right to demand that the civil authority renounce the protection it owes to the religion of the immense majority? It is, then, not question here of imposing any yoke whatsoever upon our separated brethren, but of halting the course of an error insulting to the Church and her divine Head, and which consists in repeating, with the indifferentists, that the alliance of Church and State, instead of being a goal proposed by Christ in giving His Gospel, would be a temporary and superannuated form from which Christian liberalism delivers us.⁴⁸

Whence comes the confusion between tolerance on the one hand, and indifferentism and the agnosticism of the State on the other? In reality, the problem arises from a univocal way of thinking, deprived of all sense of analogy; a way of thinking according to which between the prohibition of the public exercise of false religions and the equality of all religions there is no middle term:

The objection and the misunderstanding on the subject of tolerance arise from the fact that one does not suppose a middle term between the exclusion of dissident sects and equality granted to all. Only two forms of relations between Church and State are envisaged: the protection granted to the Church by the State in a nation where the religious unity is complete and where no dissident sects are tolerated; and the equal protection granted by the State to all religious confessions that do not disturb the public peace, with no privilege for the Catholic Church recognized. The matter being thus framed, it is not difficult to establish that the unity of religion has been broken in modern societies and therefore to conclude that the second form, however inferior it may be to the first, is the only one admissible today. But there is a third hypothesis, which is the right one: it is that of the Christian State, acknowledging the divine mission of the Catholic Church, and nevertheless tolerating, without actual cooperation, the practice of dissident religions, which have the rights acquired by this tolerance.⁴⁹

Is the obligation to exercise tolerance a sign of a healthy society?

Insofar as the exercise of tolerance is caused by an evil disseminated in a society, in the same measure it must be observed that sickness is undermining the social body.

Tolerance is a response made to a sickness in society, error or sin. The extent of its usage is a clear sign of the general state of a society: "...the more a State is driven to tolerate evil, the further is it from perfection...."⁵⁰

How does the tolerance defined by Catholic doctrine differ from the freedom advocated by liberalism?

According to Catholic doctrine, tolerance is a matter of circumstances and prudence in the application of immutable principles, whereas liberalism advocates the definitive sacrifice of these principles, purportedly inapplicable, in favor of a liberty defined as an absolute good.

The Church has always striven to apply with prudence and discernment the immutable principles to the changing conditions of society. The ideal She presents is that of a collaboration between the Church and the State, and the social kingship of Jesus Christ. Certainly, she cannot but observe that today the conditions for realizing this ideal are far from being optimal:

The Church does not hide the fact that she considers this collaboration [between the Church and the State] in principle to be normal, and that she considers the unity of a people in the true religion and the unanimity of action between herself and the State to be the ideal. But she also knows that for a while events have been developing rather in the opposite direction, that is to say, towards a multiplicity of religious confessions and conceptions of life in the same national community–in which the Catholics would constitute a more or less substantial minority.⁵¹

The Church never sacrifices her principles to circumstances. She tolerates what she cannot avoid, but she always works towards the entire realization of the ideal Christ confided to her:

...Pius IX's doctrine is that of Gregory XVI and of Pius VI; it is the same, not only because the same divine spirit that animated these two pontiffs is in him, but because the teachings the Church has received from his sacred mouth are there before us, and in which we venerate the age-old doctrine in all its firmness and immutability.

Undoubtedly, when we contemplate the state of modern societies we cannot keep from recognizing with sadness the movement that drags them very far, alas! from the true Christian theory; but we honor the inspired constancy of the Church, our Mother, who never compromises with error; and, full of confidence in the supernatural vocation of nations, we salute before hand the day when, after the experiences and the trials that, perhaps, Divine Providence yet has in store for them, they will return and place themselves under the yoke of Christ the King, and will repeat, from one extremity of Europe to the other, the ancient motto of Charlemagne's France: Deus vincit, Deus regnat, Deus imperat.⁵²

Thus one readily understands Archbishop Lefebvre's insistent objections against a conciliar doctrine and practice that sacrifice principles to public pressure:

Tolerance is a Catholic principle and is, under certain circumstances, a duty of charity and of political prudence towards the minorities. Tolerantism is, on the contrary, a liberal error which wants to grant to all dissidents indiscriminately and under all circumstances, and in justice, the same rights as the ones enjoyed by those who are in the truth, moral or religious.⁵³

But be careful! For the liberal Catholics, that is not the question! According to them, in practice, the principles which are nevertheless by definition rules of action, must not be applied or advocated because they are inapplicable, they say. This is obviously false: must we renounce the preaching and the application of the commandments of God...because people want no more of this? Because modern mentality tends to the liberation from all moral rules? Is it necessary to renounce the social Kingship of Jesus Christ in a country under the pretext that Mohammed or Buddha wants a place there?⁵⁴

 

Translated exclusively by Angelus Press from Sel de la Terre, No.57, Summer 2006. Fr. François Knittel, ordained for the Society of Saint Pius X in 1989, is stationed at the Society's priory in Strasbourg, France.