QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Can it truly be said that the Jewish race is guilty of the sin of deicide, and that it is consequently cursed by God as depcited in Gibson's movie on the Passion?
The teaching of Sacred Scripture on this question is quite explicit. St. John explains that if Pilate sentenced Jesus Christ to death, it was only on account of the insistence of the Jews:
When the chief priests, therefore, and the servants, had seen him, they cried out, saying: Crucify him, crucify him. Pilate saith to them: Take him you, and crucify him: for I find no cause in him. The Jews answered him: We have a law; and according to the law he ought to die, because he made himself the Son of God. (Jn. 19:6, 7)
The Synoptic Evangelists state the same thing, e.g., Lk. 23:22-24:
Why, what evil hath this man done? I find no cause of death in him. I will chastise him therefore, and let him go. But they were instant with loud voices, requiring that he might be crucified; and their voices prevailed. And Pilate gave sentence that it should be as they required.
The Jews were consequently directly responsible for the crucifixion. Deicide is the name given to the crime of killing the person who is God, namely the Son of God in His human nature. It is those persons who brought about the crucifixion who are guilty of deicide, namely the Jews.
St. Matthew's Gospel states very clearly, not only that Pilate considered Jesus innocent of the accusations made against him, but also that the whole people of the Jews took the responsibility of his murder upon their own heads. Indeed, to Pilate's statement: "I am innocent of the blood of this just man; look you to it," the response is immediate: "And the whole people answering, said: His blood be upon us and upon our children." (Mt. 27:24, 25) The Gospel teaches us, therefore, that the Jewish race brought upon themselves the curse that followed the crime of deicide.
However, in what does that curse consist? Surely it cannot be that there is a collective guilt of the Jewish race for the sin of deicide. For only those individuals are responsible for the sin who knowingly and willingly brought it about. Jews of today are manifestly not responsible for that sin. The curse is of a different nature, and corresponds to the greatness of the vocation of the Jewish people as a preparation for the Messias, to the superiority of their election, which makes them first in the order of grace. Just as the true Israelites, who accept the Messias, are the first to receive "glory, honor and peace to every one that worketh good, to the Jew first, and also to the Greek" (Rm. 2:10), so also are they the first to receive the punishment of their refusal of the Messias: "Tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that worketh evil, of the Jew first, and also of the Greek" (Rm. 2:9). The curse is then the punishment for the hardhearted rebelliousness of a people that has refused the time of its visitation, that has refused to convert and to live a moral, spiritual life, directed towards heaven. This curse is the punishment of blindness to the things of God and eternity, of deafness to the call of conscience and to the love of good and hatred of evil which is the basis of all moral life, of spiritual paralysis, of total preoccupation with an earthly kingdom. It is this that sets them as a people in entire opposition with the Catholic Church and its supernatural plan for the salvation of souls. Fr. Denis Fahey in The Kingship of Christ and Organized Naturalism explains this radical opposition. He describes "the Naturalism of the Jewish Nation" and the "age-long struggle of the Jewish Nation against the supernatural life of the Mystical Body of Our Lord Jesus Christ" (p. 42). He goes on to explain that "We must distinguish accurately between opposition to the domination of Jewish Naturalism in society and hostility to the Jews as a race," which latter form of opposition "is what is designated by the term Antisemitism, and has been more than once condemned by the Church. The former opposition is incumbent on every Catholic and on every true lover of his native land" (ibid. p. 43).
Fr. Fahey develops his explanation of the nature of this naturalism of the Jewish nation, detailing the two essential truths of the supernatural order that they refused in the time of Christ Our Lord, and continue to refuse to this day:
They refused, firstly, to accept that the Supernatural life of His Messianic Kingdom was higher than their national life and, secondly, they utterly rejected the idea of the Gentile Nations being admitted to enter the Messianic Kingdom on the same level as themselves. Thus they put their national life above the supernatural life of Grace and set racial descent from Abraham according to the flesh on a higher plane than spiritual descent from Abraham by faith. Having put their race and nation in the place of God, having in fact deified them, they rejected the supernatural Messias and elaborated a program of preparation for the natural Messias to come. (Ibid., pp. 43-44)
It is indeed very sad that the post-conciliar Church has forgotten the elementary distinction described by Father Fahey, namely between opposition to Jewish Naturalism and hostility to the race. The door was opened to this, and to the subsequent acceptation of Judaism as a legitimate religion in the Vatican II Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions, Nostra Aetate. After correctly pointing out that the Jewish authorities pressed for the death of Christ, and that neither all Jews at that time, nor today "can be charged with the crimes committed during his Passion," it then continues with the outrageous statement, so contrary to Sacred Scripture, that "the Jews should not be spoken of as rejected or accursed as if this followed from holy Scripture" (§4). It is consequently considered that since the Church reproves every form of persecution, then we must respect their false national religion, regardless of the fact that its very existence is the sign of the curse of the national naturalism that has fallen upon them.
The January 2002 statement of the Pontifical Biblical Commission, entitled The Jewish People and their Sacred Scriptures in the Christian Bible, likewise refuses to make the same elementary distinction. It apologizes, for example, that certain New Testament passages that criticize the Pharisees had been used to justify anti-Semitism. This has never been the case in the Catholic Church, but they certainly do inspire us to stand against the hypocritical naturalism of those who refuse to convert. Our Lord is very explicit about the curse that the Scribes and Pharisees have brought upon themselves, repeating the curse "Woe to you scribes and Pharisees" no less than 8 times in 17 verses in St. Matthew's Gospel (23:13-29): "Woe to you scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites; because you shut the kingdom of heaven against men, for you yourselves do not enter in; and those that are going in, you suffer not to enter...." The Jewish refusal of the supernatural order, as of the Messias, has made their religion, true until the time of Our Lord, now a false one. Hence the malediction, and our opposition to their refusal of the supernatural order, which is not anti-Semitism.
From this follows the essential thesis of the above-mentioned document, namely that the Jewish concept of a future Messias does not conflict with the Christian belief in Jesus, for, it states, "The Jewish Messianic expectation is not vain." How could such an expectation be not vain, given that they refuse Christ, the only Messias, who has already come? This means, if taken to its logical conclusion, that the refusal of the mystery of the Incarnation, of the birth of our Divine Savior in the flesh, is no longer a sin of infidelity, that is, a grave sin against the Faith. If this were the case, how could it still be true for Our Lord to say: "I am the way, and the truth and the life. No man cometh to the Father but by me" (Jn. 14:6)?
Q. Is it a mortal sin to vote for a pro-abortion candidate?
A. The casting of a vote can be a virtuous act, even in our modern liberal democracies, in which so much of the system is not only opposed to our holy religion, but even to the natural law itself. However, for a vote to be a virtuous act, it must be directed towards its end, namely the common good. Consequently, it is in itself a grave sin to vote for an unworthy candidate, for the choice of a candidate whose life or policies are immoral is an illicit cooperation in bringing about a grave evil on society. There can be no doubt that abortion, the murder of the innocent, is one of the greatest evils afflicting modern society, and that it is crying out to heaven for vengeance. Consequently, there can not in itself be any justification for voting for any candidate who is pro-abortion, or in any way tolerant of abortion.
The question arises, however, as to whether there could be sufficient reason to vote for a candidate who might consent to some abortions, for example to avoid a more serious evil, such as to defeat a candidate who might be in favor of homosexual marriages or who might actively promote abortions or some other great evil, such as unjust wars.
The theologians answer that the act of casting a vote is a material cooperation in the evil that that candidate might cause, and not necessarily a formal cooperation (Cf. Prummer, III, §604). This means that the person who casts the vote is not necessarily directly responsible for what a bad candidate might do once elected, even if he foresaw that he would perform some evil deeds. In such cases of material cooperation, the Church allows the application of the principles of the indirect voluntary. It is permissible, since the act of casting a vote is not in itself bad, and the end is good, namely to avoid a greater evil. However, there must be a very grave reason to justify such material cooperation, and all scandal would have to be avoided. This could be the case, for example, if a person were to vote for a Protestant whose platform was in general in accordance with the natural law, but who might have some false principles concerning divorce or the funding of Catholic schools, or on some environmental issue. In such a case, it would be permissible to choose the lesser evil, and to vote for a candidate who is not entirely good, on the condition that there is a very grave reason, namely to avoid a much greater evil.
The question here is whether there could ever possibly be such a grave reason that could justify a person voting for a pro-abortion candidate. Is it possible for there to be a greater evil that could justify such a participation in this evil of abortion, even only a material participation? I cannot conceive that this could be possible, for abortion is such a perverse and horrible crime.
It is possible to conceive of a greater evil that would allow one to vote for a candidate who would accept (unwillingly) abortions under certain exceptional circumstances such as rape, for this is frequently done in order to prevent the election of a candidate who is positively pro-abortion. This is a frequent occurrence, and is certainly permissible. However, it is inconceivable that a Catholic would vote for a politician who is positively pro-abortion simply because he likes his tax scheme or his social policies. In such an instance there would be no proportion at all, and it would certainly be a grave sin, even if the intention were only for a material cooperation.
If in general it is narrow-minded to be a single issue voter, this certainly does not apply to the abortion question. The common good absolutely and necessary requires the abolition of abortions from public life, and it is of such overwhelming importance for the good of society, that no person could be considered imprudent for voting on the basis of this question alone.
Q. Can I associate with a traditional friend or relative who, having been formerly traditional, has now abandoned Tradition?
A. It is certainly a grave scandal when a long-term practicing traditional Catholic becomes Novus Ordo on account of money, ease or convenience, discouragement, lukewarmness or laxity. Clearly we cannot possibly accept this change in their life. The principle, once a Catholic always a Catholic, enshrined in the traditional code of Canon Law, applies just as much to traditional Catholics. A traditional Catholic does not have the right to become a modernist, and must be openly rebuked and opposed if he tries to do so.
Does this mean that we should have nothing to do with such a person, as would seem to be indicated by II Jn. 10? "If anyone comes to you and does not bring this doctrine, do not receive him into the house, or say to him, Welcome. For he who says to him, Welcome, is sharer in his evil works," and by II Cor. 6:14-15: "What fellowship has light with darkness? What harmony is there between Christ and Belial? Or what part has the believer with the unbeliever?" Given the confusion of the present crisis in the Church, it would seem that the presumption should be for the practice of charity, namely that while maintaining our disapproval of a wrong and faithless or liberal lifestyle, we should do all in our power to exert a positive influence of kindness to inspire such a person to pray. This will barely be possible if the apostate from Tradition is a person in authority, but might be quite feasible if it concerns an inferior over whom we have authority, such as a son or younger person. The decision as to whether or not to maintain some degree of association is a decision of prudence that will depend upon all these circumstances, and especially upon our own strength of faith and conviction.
Q. If the Mass is the unbloody renewal of the sacrifice of Calvary, why does the priest pray the Orate fratres at the Offertory of Mass?
A. The prayer of the Orate fratres is offered up that the sacrifice might become pleasing to Almighty God. This does not mean that the sacrifice of the Cross was in any way displeasing to God, for it was of infinite value and merit. Nor does it mean that the sacrifice of the Mass is a different sacrifice from that of the Cross, for, as the Council of Trent declared, "that same Christ is contained and immolated in an unbloody manner, who on the altar of the Cross once offered Himself...it is one and the same Victim...as He who then offered Himself on the Cross" (Sess. XXII, Ch.2, Dz. 940).
The sacrifice is consequently perfectly acceptable in itself, for there is nothing imperfect in the principal Priest, the Victim or the sacrifice itself. It is our offering of the sacrifice, the manner in which we are associated with the unbloody renewal of the sacrifice, that can mar it, and make it unacceptable to the Almighty. This acceptability may seem secondary, and yet it is absolutely essential for it to apply the fruits of the Passion to our souls. It depends upon our disposition of soul, and of how generously we offer ourselves in union with the divine Victim. It is our disposition that limits the varying abundance of the fruits of this sacrifice for our souls, for the value and merits of Christ's sacrifice are unlimited. This disposition can be defective, both on the part of the human priest's offering of the sacrifice in the person of Christ, and also on the part of the laity's participation by offering of themselves from the pew. Hence the prayer: "Brothers, pray that my sacrifice and yours may be acceptable to God the Father Almighty." How we must have an acute awareness of our unworthiness to offer up or participate in this sacrifice, and humbly beg that despite this it may obtain many graces and blessings, and that it might truly be "to the praise and glory of His name, to our own benefit, and to that of all his HolyChurch"!
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