WE READ in Genesis 1:26 that God created man in His image. Because of the dignity, preciousness and nobility of man, the shedding of innocent blood—murder—is forbidden. "Thou shalt not kill" (Ex. 20:13). Again: "You must not profane the land you live in. Blood profanes the country" (Num. 35: 33). Man's nature as an imago Dei is the reason why capital punishment is prescribed for those who murder: "Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God man was made" (Gen. 9:6).

Abortion has been desecrating the land in increasingly large numbers since the Roe v. Wade decision in 1973. From 1974 to 1980, the last year for which statistics are available, the number of legal, reported abortions rose yearly:

If these figures are protracted for 1981-85, then some fifteen million human beings have been murdered since 1973. Note that this number represents only the reported abortions.

It is not surprising that the number of abortions has increased yearly. Like all evil, abortion is much easier to commit when sanctioned by a "corrupt tribunal that imposes disorder as law . . . and condemns the innocent to death" (Ps. 94: 20-21). And, secondly, once we sin, we are the servants of sin, as Christ said (John 8:34). Sin is slavery. It tends to become a habit that dominates us, and under whose spell we are all but helpless. Abortionists promote sin under the guise of freedom—"reproductive freedom," "freedom to control one's body," and so on. St. Peter's words are relevant: "They promise freedom, but they themselves are slaves, slaves to corruption; because if anyone lets himself be dominated by anything, then he is a slave to it" (II Peter 2: 19-20).

However, it is shocking to find religious organizations kow-towing to abortionist propaganda. Instead of stressing the intrinsic evil of abortion, and that the Supreme Court's decision is an unjust law, because it is opposed to the common and divine good,² religionists are attempting to justify abortion in the name of a "biblical faith."

The 195th General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), held in 1983, is illustrative. In their policy statement entitled "Covenant and Creation: Theological Reflections on Contraception and Abortion," abortion is countenanced when it is 1) "a responsible choice within a Christian ethical framework when serious genetic problems arise or when the resources are not adequate to care for a child appropriately"; or when it is 2) "the only solution for unintended or problematic pregnancies"; or when we 3) "trust in God's Spirit to guide us in our decision . . . . Only in the knowledge of such grace and guidance could we dare to claim the responsibility and freedom to use modern medical skill to intervene in the process of human procreation." When Christians act under one of these guidelines, the document assures us, they "will make the decisions [the moral choices related to contraception, pregnancy and abortion] knowing that the value and dignity of human life are bestowed by God the Creator Who calls us into a covenant relationship with our God and with each other. Faith in God surely leads to profound respect for human life."³

The killing of fetal life a sign of profound respect for human life? By murdering life in the womb we know that the value and dignity of human life are bestowed by God? Abortion an exercise of faith? A responsible choice within a Christian ethical framework? An act in which we are guided by God's Spirit? Such inanity boggles the mind! Yet is it not atypical. Masquerading sin as God's word is fashionable among modern religionists. The blasphemy is common because, among other reasons, the mind has not been transformed by the Spirit of Truth and Truth itself, and so it is a slave to the spirit of the age. As St. Paul puts it: "Do not model yourselves on the behavior of the world around you, but let your behavior change, modeled by your new mind. This is the only way to discover the will of God and know what is good, what it is that God wants, what is the perfect thing to do" (Rom. 12:21).

God abhors "hands that shed innocent blood" (Prov. 6:17). Thus He commands, "The innocent . . . you shall not put to death" (Ex. 23:7). Who is more innocent than the fetus? We are to "rescue the weak and needy, save them from the clutches of the wicked" (Ps. 82: 4). Who is weaker, and more in need than the defenseless fetus? And let us not forget that God is the Avenger of innocent blood which cries from earth to heaven (Gen. 4:10).

When Our Father endowed us with life, He "watched (our) bones take shape" (Ps. 139:15), and "watched each breath with tender care" (Job 10:12). Moreover, He has made each one of us "a little less than a god," and has crowned us "with glory and splendor" (Ps. 8:15). Our loving Father has "exalted our days from the womb" (Ecc. 50:24). All His creatures are loved by Him: "You love all that exists, you hold nothing of what you have made in abhorrence; for had you hated anything, you would not have formed it" (Wis. 11:25).

Only God, the Creator of all that exists, has sovereignty over life. Because of our metaphysical situation as creatures, we do not have sovereignty over our own lives, or the lives of others. We did not make ourselves; our lives are a gift from God which He entrusts to us. We are stewards, not lords. Our metaphysical situation as a creature imposes on us certain moral restrictions: self-mutilation, changing sex, inflicting moral trials (suffering), artificial birth control, abortion—these among others are forbidden. When we step out of our metaphysical situation as a creature, we "play God"; we set our own terms for our existence, thereby infringing upon the rights God has as our Creator. We, not God, decide who is to live or die; how long one should live; what our sex should be, and so forth. By making these decisions, man is acting as if he is his own lord, the master of life. But we are stewards, not lords. As St. Paul expresses it: "Do you not know . . . that you are not your own? For you have been bought at a great price. Glorify God and bear Him in your body" (I Cor. 6:19-20). The Psalmist also puts it succinctly: "Yahweh . . . made us and we belong to him" (Ps. 100:3).

Whether we see ourselves as lords or stewards is the crux of the matter. Abortionists want to be lords. They desire to "rise above" their metaphysical situation as creatures, and enter God's realm. Satan tempted Eve by saying that if she and Adam ate of the tree of knowledge they would be like gods, knowing good and evil (Gen. 3:5-6). Similarly, the abortionists feel like gods, having power over human life.

The revolt against man's creaturehood, and the desire for power over human life, reaches its apex in the "quality of life" ethic—an ethic that is a logical and an inevitable outgrowth of the abortionist mentality. If the unborn baby can be put to death because there is a chance that he will be born defective, then so can anyone else with defects. If the fetus can be killed because he lacks self-determination, or the ability to choose, or the knowledge of his circumstances, then so can anyone else who meets one or more of these criteria—an infant just after birth, someone gravely retarded, or insane, or in a coma. And if a happy life is something we are entitled to, something without which life is not worth living and ought to be destroyed—an argument contained in the abortionists' objection that the unborn baby should be killed because he will be born defective, and therefore doomed to an unhappy life—then all persons living unhappy lives ought to be killed. The abortionist attitude goes hand in hand with the quality-of-life ethic.

How can a creature say, "This baby shouldn't live because he's going to be born defective"? How can he conclude that this fetus, or this child, or this man should be killed because he lacks self-determination? How can he argue that "this fetus shouldn't live because he is destined to a life filled with unhappiness"? Who is man to judge? He is arrogating power to himself; he is usurping decisions which belong to God alone.

Because the logic of the quality-of-life position mirrors that of abortion, the legalization of the former is only a matter of time—if we sit back and do nothing. Never happen? Who would have thought, say in 1955, that abortion-on-demand would be the law of the land in 1973?

In fact, the quality-of-life ethic is gaining ground. The mere fact that its advocates can publish in influential journals is an ominous sign. For example, Peter Singer, in an article entitled "Sanctity of Life or Quality of Life," which appeared in the July 1983 issue of Pediatrics, approves of infanticide on the grounds that many babies compare unfavorably to dogs and pigs:

Satanic irony. An article in Pediatrics calling for the murder of defective infants. The pediatrician—the "baby doctor" who is concerned not only with curing illness and treating defects, but with all aspects of the child's growth and development—is to stop such "racist" activity and begin to murder infants who don't measure up to Singer's "quality of life" standards. He is to literally throw out the baby with the bath water.

There are, obviously, a number of errors in Singer's analysis.⁵

There errors, moreover, are widespread in the abortion and quality of life literature, and therefore merit attention. Some of them are:

1. The being of man admits of degrees. Singer holds, for example, that a defective human infant is less of a human being than a "normal" one because the latter has "greater capacities of rationality, self-consciousness, and communication." For him, a human being can exist in various degrees as a human being; it is possible to speak of one human person as being more or less of a human person than another.

This is a grave error. The being of man admits of no degrees. It is absurd to say that one human being is more of a human person than another. In this sense, there are no degrees of being human; there is no scale of "more" or "less." Thus man either exists completely as man or he doesn't exist as man at all; there is no third alternative.

And so it is indeed strange—not to say vile—to read and hear that there are degrees vis-a-vis the very kind of being that the human person is—that the fetus, although human, is not a complete human being; that a human being becomes fully human at birth, or at one-year-old; that a healthy child is more of a human person than an infant with spina bifida; that a mentally retarded child is less of a human being than a gifted one, and the like.

2. It is also a great error to affirm, as does Singer, that nonhuman animals "have superior capacities, both actual and potential, for rationality, self-consciousness, (and) communication," than do infants with severe defects—or any other handicapped human being for that matter. For if this were true, then these creatures would be human persons, not subhuman animals—and not even Singer wants to maintain such a silly position.

If animals could rationalize, then they would be have to have knowledge of things. But animals are incapable of knowledge. It is obviously absurd, for example, to hold that a dog knows itself to be a dog; or that it knows itself to be, let's say, a Doberman; or that it knows the color of its eyes and coat; or that it knows whether its tail is long or short.

In addition, if a subhuman animal could rationalize, not only would it have knowledge of its own being, but it would be able to learn theology, philosophy, mathematics, psychology, sociology, history—all the subjects man is capable of learning. Once again, to suggest that animals are capable of such knowledge is ludicrous.

Nor are animals capable of participating in the realm of language. For example, they can neither ask questions nor answer them. Nor can they form judgments. What animal can predicate P of S, and grasp the truth that S is P? What does it know about the laws of judgment? Of the valid and invalid forms of reasoning? Subhuman animals, by virtue of being subhuman animals, are excluded from this realm.

Furthermore, what animal is aware of the moral laws? Which one is conscious of the moral struggle within man that St. Paul vividly expresses (Rom. 7: 15-23)? What sense does it make to say that an animal is just or unjust, veracious or untruthful, and so on?

Perhaps Singer would object that it is obviously true that an animal cannot have knowledge, or use language, or participate in the moral or even religious life. But if an animal could rationalize, be self-conscious, and communicate, then it would have, like the human person, a rational nature, and therefore it would have the ability to perform human acts like the ones discussed above. If Singer acknowledges that an animal cannot perform these human acts, then he is inconsistent; he fails to carry out the metaphysical consequences of his position that certain nonhuman animals have the ability to rationalize and communicate. And if he insists that a nonhuman animal can know, can use a language, can perform moral and religious acts, and other human acts, then there is no hope for him.

Underlying Singer's conviction that certain nonhuman animals are capable of rational acts, self-consciousness and communication, is the error of thinking that the difference between man and subhuman animals is one of degree, not of kind. But we have shown, if but briefly, that there is a radical difference between personal and nonpersonal things. When we ponder the kind of being that is man, we grasp that he is vastly different from, and superior to, any animal. We see that this difference is not one of degree; it is not a difference than can be overcome by a refinement or development of the activities of nonpersonal beings. Despite Singer's reference to the defective infant as "human," and to a dog and a pig as "nonhuman," which gives the impression that he is talking about two different kinds of beings, when he avers that some nonhuman animals are capable of performing rational acts, he clearly presupposes that the difference between man and some nonhuman animals is one of degree within the same kind of being. He says as much when he asserts, "Our better understanding of our own nature had bridged the gulf that was once thought to lie between ourselves and other species."

Again, Singer's error is not unique. Not only do many quality of life advocates make the same mistake, but so do many abortionists. Abortionists who maintain that the fetus is a nonhuman being which develops into a human being at birth, or at one-year-old, or at the age of reason, or at some other time are also guilty of the gross error of affirming that the difference between personal and nonpersonal being is one of degree.

3. Singer captures the essence of the quality of life and pro-abortion positions with the diabolical assertion, "Species membership alone . . . is not morally relevant." For Singer, man, precisely as man, is not a morally relevant factor; he becomes morally relevant when he has "superior capacities for rationality . . ." If he does not have these superior capacities, or the potential for them, then he is not morally relevant; thus his being put to death is not an immoral act. To have "limited . . . capacity for intelligent or even conscious life," is according to Singer, to have no morally relevant value as a human being. Hence the mentally retarded, deaf mutes—any severely handicapped human being—can be killed—murdered. Not to worry, says Singer. It's not immoral. Blah, blah, blah . . .

Despite many absurd statements, Singer is nevertheless correct on one point—a society that approves of abortion has no reason to reject infanticide and euthanasia; for all three kill innocent human beings. Given the fact that abortion has been legalized, Singer argues, then euthanasia and infanticide should be legalized too.

Singer's piece calls to mind an article entitled "A New Ethic for Medicine and Society," which was published in California Medicine, the official voice of the California Medical Association, in 1970. The articles have several things in common: both call for the rejection of the sanctity of life ethic; both support abortion, infanticide, and euthanasia; both acknowledge that support of abortion necessarily entails support of euthanasia and infanticide; and both were published in prestigious medical journals.

Ponder the following passage from "A New Ethic for Medicine and Society":

President Reagan has put it well. "The real question today," he writes, "is not when human life begins, but, what is the value of human life?"⁷ The abortionists and quality of life supporters answer: "Human life as such has no morally relevant value; therefore we are morally allowed to kill innocent human beings." As so we are witnessing what C. Everett Koop, M.D., Surgeon General of the United States has called "The Slide to Auschwitz."⁸

1. The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1984 (New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc., 1983), p. 913.

2. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theolgiae, q. 96, art. 4.

3. The policy statement is reprinted in Franky Schaeffer's Bad News for Modern Man (Westchester, Illinois: Crossway Books, 1984), pp. 165-171.

4. Ibid., p. 156.

5. For the following critique of Singer I'm indebted to the excellent article of John F. Crosby,  "Evolutionism  and  the Ontology of the Human Person: Critique of the Marxist Theory of the Emergence of Man," The Review of Politics, Vol. 38, No. 2, April, 1976, pp. 208-243. Many of Dr. Crosby's objections to Marxist theory can be applied to Singer's position. I use two of them.

6. Quoted in Marlin Maddoux, America Betrayed! (Shreveport, Louisiana: Huntington House, Inc., 1984), p. 126.

7. Ronald Reagan, Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation (New York: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1984), p. 22.

8. C. Everett Koop, M.D., The Slide to Auschwitz; ibid., pp. 41-73.