Dignitatis Humanae: Liberty or License?

The article which follows gives us a better understanding of the Vatican II document—The Declaration on Religious Liberty, which His Grace Archbishop Lefebvre has so vigorously denounced.

In his speech which opened Vatican II, Pope John explained the principal duty of the Council: "The greatest concern... is this: that the sacred deposit of Christian doctrine should be guarded and taught more efficaciously... The Twenty-first Ecumenical Council... wishes to transmit the doctrine, pure and integral, without any attenuation or distortion, which throughout twenty centuries... has become the common patrimony of men."¹

By the end of the Council, however, Pope Paul discovered what Pope John did not live to learn: the Deposit of Faith cannot be safeguarded while simultaneously called for aggiornamento (updating), riforma (reform), and rinnovamento (renewal). The fresh air that was supposed to enter the Church turned out to be carbon monoxide. The poison, Pope Paul insisted, is not in any conciliar document, but in faulty interpretations. Witness some of his assertions: "The Council has not inaugurated a period of dogmatic and moral uncertainty" (Dec. 23, 1965). Regarding novel interpretations he said we should "not... put in doubt and subject to inquiry all that the Council has taught us" (Dec. 15, 1965, General Audience). "It would be wrong to think that the Council represents a break or as some believe, a liberation, from the traditional doctrine of the Church" (Jan. 12, 1966, General Audience).²

Catholics are under no obligation, it goes without saying, to believe the Council achieved its goal of safeguarding and teaching revealed doctrine more efficaciously; or that the Council has not departed from the doctrinal heritage of the Church. One the contrary: suppose we had not read the conciliar documents but were familiar with Pope Paul's defense of their orthodoxy. Suppose, moreover, we knew about his many warnings against heterodox interpretations and his ejaculations to read the documents in light of tradition. That Pope Paul harped on these subjects over and over again is enough to make one suspicious concerning the trustworthiness of the documents. After all, never before has a Pope had to do this; for the teachings of the Church were clearly expressed in the documents themselves. It seems Pope Paul was cautioning the faithful to reach what Archbishop Lefebvre called "time bombs"—ambiguous phrases—in harmony with Tradition. This state of affairs is a far cry from what Pope John had hoped for at the start of the Council. Not satisfied with reaffirming the traditional teaching of the Church—for this, he said, a "Council was not necessary"—Pope John expected "a step forward toward a doctrinal penetration and a formation of consciousness in faithful and perfect conformity to the authentic doctrine."³

This article will attempt to prove, by analyzing Dignitatis Humanae, that Pope Paul was wrong: 1) there are teachings of Vatican II which are incompatible with traditional teachings of the Church; 2) this break from Tradition is intentional and unequivocal—it cannot be attributed to ambiguous terminology or heterodox interpretation; and 3) it is therefore impossible to harmonize these teachings with traditional doctrine.

The first teaching of Dignitatis Humanae which cannot be squared with traditional doctrine is the assertion: "[T]he human person has a right to religious freedom." The Council then explains what it means by religious freedom: "Freedom of this kind means that all men should be immune from coercion on the part of individuals, social groups and every human power so that, within due limits, nobody is forced to act against his convictions in religious matters in private or in public, alone or in association with others" (#2).

Notice that Dignitatis Humanae is not granting absolute or unlimited religious freedom—which has always been repudiated by the Church⁴—but liberty "within due limits": that is, "as long as the just requirements of public order are observed" (#2). The requirements of public order are just, in turn, when they are based on "legal principles which are in conformity with the objective moral order" (#7). The right to religious liberty, therefore, cannot be infringed upon as long as a person is acting in accordance with the objective moral realm. *

Even though Dignitatis Humanae calls for religious freedom in a limited, not absolute sense, it is still at odds with traditional teaching because the latter affirms that the person does not have a right to religious liberty. Only truth has rights; therefore we have a right to profess only the Catholic Faith. The Church speaks:

Pope Leo XIII: Immortale Dei (1885)⁵

—[W]e are bound absolutely to worship God in that way which He has shown to be His will.

—No one is allowed to be remiss in the service due to God, and—the chief duty of all men is to cling to religion in both its teaching and practice— not such religion as they may have a preference for, but the religion which God enjoins, and which certain and most clear marks show to be the only true religion.

—It is a part of this theory [indifferentism] that all questions that concern religion are to be referred to private judgment; that everyone is to be free to follow whatever religion he prefers, or none at all if he disapprove of all. From this the following consequences logically flow: that the most unrestrained opinions may be openly expressed as to the practice or omission of divine worship and that everyone has unbounded license to think whatever he chooses and to publish⁶ abroad whatever he thinks.

Pope Gregory XVI: Mirari vos (1832):

Now from this evil-smelling spring of indifferentism flows the erroneous and absurd opinion... or rather, derangement—that freedom of conscience must be asserted and vindicated for everyone.⁷ This most pestilential errors opens the door to the complete and immoderate liberty of opinions, which works such widespread harm both in Church and State.⁸

Pope Pius IX in his Syllabus of Errors (1894) condemned the following:

15) Every man is free to embrace and profess that religion which, led by the light of reason, he may have thought true.⁹

Pius IX, moreover, infallibly condemns¹⁰ the following propositions in Quanta Cura (1864):

[T]he best condition of human society is that wherein no duty is recognized by the government of correcting, by enacted penalties, the violators of the Catholic Religion, except when the maintenance of the public peace requires it.

[T]he liberty of conscience and of worship is the peculiar (or inalienable) right of every man.¹¹

As is evident from these quotes, there is no right to religious freedom because error is put on par with truth. Dignitatis Humanae epitomizes this abomination when it states that the right to religious liberty "continues to exist even in those who do not live up to their obligation of seeking the truth and adhering to it" (#2). This is not liberty but license—indifferentism—which, as Pope Gregory XVI rightly observes, "opens the door to the complete and immoderate liberty of opinions that works such widespread harm in both Church and State."

In Catholic tradition religious error has no rights;¹² but it is often tolerated so that a great good may result or evil be avoided.¹³ Pope Leo XIII writes in Immortale Dei: "The Church, indeed, deems it unlawful to place various forms of divine worship on the same footing as true religion, but does not, on that account, condemn those rulers who for the sake of securing some great good, or of hindering some great evil, tolerate in practice that these various forms of religion have a place in the state."¹⁴

Because the Church teaches, guards, and interprets Revelation, if she declares that there is no right to religious liberty, then, of course, this right will not be found in Scripture. Nevertheless, Dignitatis Humanae contends it is there, if only implicitly: "This doctrine of freedom is rooted in divine revelation... Although revelation does not affirm in so many words the right to immunity from external coercion in religious matters, it nevertheless shows forth the dignity of the human person in all its fullness." (#9). This non sequitur is a major mistake: From the truth that the human person has tremendous dignity as made in the image of God (cf. also #2), it does not follow that he has a right to religious liberty. All we can conclude from the truth that man is made in God's image, is that he has an intellect, the proper object of which is truth; a will, the proper object of which is goodness; and a heart, the proper object of which is the lovable: that which is worthy of love, calls for love. Hence, the human person has a right to the truth, the good and the lovable.

In fact, Dignitatis Humanae's whole argument in chapter 2, "Religious Freedom in the Light of Revelation," is based on a non sequitur: From the fact that we are not allowed to use force to bring others to embrace the faith (#11)—following Christ our Master who "refused to use force to impose it [truth] on those who spoke out against it"(#11)—it does not follow that the person has a right to religious liberty.

The teaching of Dignitatis Humanae to the contrary notwithstanding, a careful reading of Scripture will reveal that man does not have a right to religious freedom.

Christ commissioned the Apostles to teach all nations "whatsoever I have commanded you" (Matt. 28:19). They of course take this obligation very seriously—"Woe to me," exclaims St. Paul, "if I do not preach the Gospel" (I Cor. 9:16). Throughout the New Testament Christ's disciples warn against teaching and adopting a different doctrine (Rom. 2:20-24; II Cor. 14-18; Gal. 1:8; Eph. 5: 7-12; Col. 2:4; I Tim 1:3-4; Tit. 1:11). Didn't St. Paul excommunicate Hymenseus and Alexander? Didn't St. John tell us not to show hospitality to those "bringing a different doctrine" (II John 10-11)? In short: if we don't accept the teachings of the Apostles, we will perish (Mk. 16:16). All this does not make sense, however, if man has a right to religious freedom.¹⁵

According to tradition, moreover, all of the Apostles except St. John died as martyrs—and even John was exiled and tortured. Think of all the martyrs down through the ages, "teacher(s)... in faith and truth" (I Tim. 2:7) who "preached it on the housetops" (Matt. 10:27), unafraid "of those who can kill the body but cannot kill the soul" (Matt. 10:28). It is inconceivable that they would lay down their lives for the truth if religious liberty were a right. No. There are martyrs because the Church disapproves of the judgment that "the soul's eternal salvation can be obtained by the profession of any faith, provided a man's morals are good and decent."¹⁶

Then, too, if religious freedom is a right, what are we to make of Christ's harsh words to those who, given sufficient evidence, nevertheless fail to embrace His Revelation? For example, He instructs the Apostles: "But whatever town you enter, and they do not receive you—go out into its streets and say, 'Even the dust from your town that cleaves to us we shake off against you; yet know this, that the kingdom of God is at hand.' I say to you, that it will be more tolerable for Sodom in that day than for that town" (Lk. 10:10-12; Mk. 6:10-11). It will also be more tolerable for Sodom than for Capharnaum; and more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon than for Corozain and Bethsaida (Matt. 11:20-24).

Perhaps the most telling example, however, is Christ's treatment of the Jews. They worshipped Yahweh and followed the moral law, the Ten Commandments. If Dignitatis Humanae is correct in asserting that religious liberty is a right as long as the moral order is observed, then the Jews have this right. But Christ says they have no such right because they refuse to believe that He is God's Divine Son. "If I had not come and spoken to them," says Our Lord, "then they would have no sin. But now they have no excuse for their sin" (John 14:27). Because the Jews remained obstinate in their disbelief, despite all that Christ said and did to prove His divinity, they were guilty in a special manner. And so when the Jews claimed to have God as their Father, Christ retorted that their father is Satan (John 8:42-47).

Recall, too, that when the Jews said they were free (John 8:33), Christ corrected them by affirming "the Son makes your free" (John 8:36). Christ makes you free because He is the Truth (John 14:6), and "the truth will set you free" (John 8:32). True freedom therefore is believing that Christ is "King of kings and Lord of lords!" (Apoc. 19:16). "When once men recognize," writes Pius XI in Quas Primas, "both in private and in public life, that Christ is King, society will at last receive the great blessings of real liberty, well-ordered discipline, peace and harmony."¹⁷

Although there is a difference between Lamennais's absolute religious freedom and Dignitatis Humanae's limited one, the following words of Archbishop Hyacinth Louis de Quelen of Paris, addressed to Lamennais, are opposite to the Declaration on Religious Liberty: "These doctrines... are supported by no solid proof, of which we find no successive and enduring monuments in antiquity, which carry nothing with them of the character of universality which distinguishes the faith of the Church from that of any other sect. We have received these doctrines neither from Jesus Christ nor from His Apostles. They carry neither the authority of Scripture nor of Tradition."¹⁸

NOTES

*. Editor's note: Which false religion does not, in some way, oppose good morals? Protestants accept contraception, and sometimes divorce; Muslims have polygamy; Jews accept usury; the worship of false gods is, in itself, against good morals and oftentimes conceals Satanism... And those who have no religion oftentime have no morals either! Thus, if one wants to implement this restriction in the full sense, "as long as the just requirements of public order are observed... based on the objective moral order," then the whole doctrine of religious liberty of Vatican II is reduced to nought; if one wants to maintain religious liberty for non-Catholics, then one is led to admit many things against the "objective moral order."

1. Abbott and Gallagher, eds., The Documents of Vatican Il, pp. 713, 715.

2. Quotes cited in Xavier Rynne, Vatican Council II (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1968), pp. 577, 578.

3. "Pope John's Opening Speech to the Council," op. cit., p. 715.

4. Cf. for example Quanta Cura's infallible declaration condemning the proposition: "[T]he liberty of conscience and of worship is the peculiar (or inalienable) right of every man, which should be proclaimed by law, and that citizens have the right to all kinds of liberty, to be restrained by no law, whether ecclesiastical or civil, by which they may be enabled to manifest openly and publicly their ideas, by word of mouth, through the press, or by any other means." (Reprinted in Approaches, May 1978, No. 61, p. 59.)

This paragraph, taken as a whole, clearly repudiates religious freedom in the absolute sense as taught by Felicité de Lamennais, and hence Dignitatis Humanae falls outside its condemnation. But if the pronouncement is split into two parts, then the first part—"The liberty of conscience and of worship is the peculiar (or inalienable) right of every man, which should be proclaimed by law"—renounces exactly what Dignitatis Humanae teaches. For Dignitatis Humanae grounds the right to religious liberty in the very nature of man (#1, #2), and declares that it "must be given such recognition in the constitutional order of society as will make it a civil right" (#2; cf. also #13 and #15).

Furthermore, the view that the State must make religious liberty a civil right is denounced in the Syllabus of Errors (#77) and in Immortale Dei, where Pope Leo XIII rejects the position that the State must not "show to any form of religious special favor; but, on the contrary, is bound to grant equal rights to every creed..." He repeats: "It is not lawful for the State, anymore than for individuals... to hold in equal favor different kinds of religion."

But Dignitatis Humanae prohibits favoritism: "Society has the right to protect itself against possible abuses done in the name of religion. However, this must not be done... by the unfair practice of favoritism...'' (#7). (My emphasis.)

5. Colman J. Barry, O.S.B., ed., Readings in Church History, Vol. 3 (New York: Newman Press, 1965), pp. 95, 100.

6. Cf. Dignitatis Humanae "Religious communities have the further right not to be prevented from publicly teaching and bearing witness to their beliefs by the spoken or written word" (#4).

7. Cf. Dignitatis Humanae "[H]e must not be... prevented from acting according to his conscience, especially in religious matters" (#3). (My emphasis.)

8. Barry, Readings, p. 41.

9. Ibid., p. 71.

10. "Therefore We by Our Apostolic authority, reprobate, denounce, and condemn generally and particularly all the evil opinions and doctrines specially mentioned in this Letter, and We wish that they may be held as reprobated, denounced, and condemned by all the children of the Catholic Church." (Approaches, op. cit., p. 63.)

11. Ibid., 58, 59.

12. "Just as vice possesses no real right to existence, whatever toleration may be shown to the vicious person, so also religious error can lay no just claim to forbearance and indulgence, even though the erring person may merit the greatest affection and esteem. There is, of course, a psychological freedom both to sin and to err, but this liberty is not equivalent to an inherent right to sin and to err in religion." [J. Pohle, "Religious Toleration," Catholic Encyclopedia (1912), p. 764.]

13. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 10, art. 11.

14. Barry, Readings, p. 102.

15. "If, by conceding a convenient right of option or a falsely understood freedom of faith, she were to leave everyone at liberty to accept or reject her dogmas, her constitution, and her sacraments, as the existing differences of religions compel the modern state to do, she [the Church] would not only fail in her divine mission, but would end her own life in voluntary suicide" (J. Pohle, op. cit., p. 766).

16. Pope Gregory XVI, Mirari vos; Barry, Readings, p. 41.

17. Quas Primas, published in the Feb. 1977 issue of Approaches.

18. Félicité de Lamennais: First Letter to Archbishop Hyacinth Louis de Quélen of Paris, 10 March 1829. Cited in Barry, Readings, p. 23.